Vanuatu takes the stage—Part Two
"A little manatee that roared has changed the prospect for climate action"
To comply with this obligation of result, the policies so adopted and the measures so taken must be such that they are able to achieve the required goal. In other words, the adoption of a policy, and the taking of related measures, as a mere formality is not sufficient to discharge the obligation of result.
—International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion on Climate Change.
In her concurring opinion, Judge Dire Tlasi wrote:
That seems harsh. She refers to the July 26 decision by the World Court in The Hague, brought by 27 Pacific Island law students and the government of Vanuatu. While widely hailed, and described with praise here last week, the opinion did not go far enough in the view of 12 of the 15 judges, who felt the need to write concurring opinions. This week I’ll highlight those.
Judge Dire Tlasi:
Judge Bogdan Aurescu:
Why the Optimism?
Costa Rican diplomat Christana Figueres was the UN Secretary for the climate framework (UNFCCC), steering the annual COPs through their tumultuous Copenhagen to Paris period when push really came to shove. Now she’s retired to a mountain rainforest and has a weekly podcast called Outrage and Optimism. In this week’s episode, her co-host Paul Dickerson brought on Julian Aguon, a lawyer for the law student plaintiffs.
Christiana asked the tough questions. Since the UN can’t compel
countries to reverse climate change, what does it matter how many
treaties it enacts or World Court decisions are taken?
Figueres: It kicked it open. How about that one?
Aguon: It kicked it open. It did.
Powerful fossil fuel producers, including the United States and Saudi Arabia, argued before the court that the 2015 Paris accord, in which nearly all countries agreed to limit greenhouse gasses, was sufficient to address climate change. The U.S. arguments were presented near the end of the Biden administration, and since then, President Trump has withdrawn the United States from the Paris Agreement.
For 40 years, countries have been hiding behind sovereign immunity, claiming that neither the UN nor any other body has the right to order them around. Sure, they may have signed The Paris Agreement, but that is a special category of law, Lex Specialis [special case], something that cannot be enforced. Obeying that was strictly voluntary, in the view of many.
I'm really, really exceedingly pleased about this opinion that we got today; that the court did not shy away from answering the second component of the question, which is question B, which is what are the legal consequences when countries breach their obligations? It didn't hold back at all, and it didn't mince its words.
It says, quote, “the full panoply of the general rules of state responsibility are applicable.” So we are talking about guarantees of non-repetition. We're talking about conversation, restitution, conversation, and satisfaction. So the full gamut, the full gamut. So now reparations, arguments for climate reparations are absolutely….
Figueres: They use that wording, “the full panoply,” I was told, over and over.
Aguon: Yes, yes. “The full panoply.”
Run the Numbers, Judge
Judge Xue Hanqin:
Around 35 per cent of the global population live in countries emitting more than 9 tCO2-eq per capita. Around 41 per cent live in countries emitting less than 3 tCO2-eq per capita. A substantial part of this population lacks access to modern energy services. Least developed countries have much lower per capita emissions (1.7 tCO2-eq) than the global average. The IPCC concludes that “[t]he 10% of households with the highest per capita emissions contribute 34-45% of global consumption-based household GHG emissions, while . . . the bottom 50% contribute 13-15%”
According to the IPCC’s reports, approximately 3.3 to 3.6 billion people live in contexts that are highly vulnerable to climate change. Global mean sea level increased by 0.20 m between 1901 and 2018. Increasing weather and climate extreme events have exposed millions of people to acute food insecurity and reduced water security, with the largest adverse impacts observed in Africa, Asia, Central and South America, least developed countries, small island developing States and the Arctic. Between 2010 and 2020, human mortality from floods, droughts and storms was 15 times higher in highly vulnerable regions, compared to regions with very low vulnerability. Economic damages from climate change have been detected in climate-exposed sectors, such as agriculture, forestry, fishery, energy and tourism. Individuals’ livelihoods have been affected through the destruction of homes and infrastructure, and the loss of property, income, human health and food security, with adverse effects on gender and social equity.
To achieve climate justice, the specific needs and circumstances of these vulnerable groups of States and peoples must be addressed in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Creditworthiness—the bull in the ring
A week before the decision came down in The Hague, Pamplona Spain hosted their annual Festival of San Fermin and the traditional Running of the Bulls. When the bulls reach the stadium, they are herded into pens, and fighting cows (“Vaquillas”) are released into the bullring for runners to interact with.
Judges Bhandari and Cleveland:
Vaquillas are not the same bulls that ran in the encierro, which are destined for the evening bullfights. Although the mass and speed of a VW bug, vaquillas’ horns are often padded. The purpose of releasing them to the crowded ring is for aspiring matadors (“espontineos”) to test their bravery and skill and to learn to deal with the raw terror of a half-ton beast bearing down on them at full speed.
Figueres: The ultimate objective is to advance both the national as well as the collective global effort to address climate change. That's the ultimate objective. And I think that that objective will be pursued.
Dickerson: That's a very thorough analysis, and I agree with it entirely. And just I'll add my own reflections on how I think that will turn up in the private sector. I mean, you have certainly the idea of financing fossil fuel companies or processes or infrastructure with heavy fossil fuels.
That becomes a considerably less attractive idea. And not least because, particularly for pure fossil fuel companies, this litigation risk makes them essentially less creditworthy. Or there's a risk that they're going to be kind of bankrupted or put into some kind of government protection where they have to pay out these damages.
Figueres: Their liability goes up.
Aguon: A bull in the ring.
Figueres: Indeed. The old saying, those who wear the chains are best suited to break them. And we saw an enormous chain broken today.
Polluter Pays
Judge Dalveer Bhandari:
Climate change remains one of the most profound existential threats facing our planet. It is not a distant or abstract concern; for many States, it poses an immediate threat to their very survival. While all States are affected, some are experiencing such severe and irreversible harm that their populations are effectively becoming refugees within their own territories.
***
First, I wish to address the “polluter pays” principle, a matter that has long been of particular concern to me in the context of both national and international environmental law. This principle, in my view, constitutes a critical normative tool in confronting the global climate crisis… Notably, the Opinion later acknowledges the potential applicability of strict liability for pollution-related harm, thereby implicitly affirming the rationale underlying the polluter pays principle.
***
While the Court addressed issues relating to the continued statehood of affected States under question (a), it should have also considered this issue under question (b), which pertains to the legal consequences for breaches of obligations identified under question (a). Restitution could have further extended to the restoration of the rights of indigenous peoples to their lands, territories, and resources adversely affected by climate change.
***
Moreover, under the Court’s jurisprudence, in cases where the precise extent of damage cannot be fully ascertained, compensation may be awarded in the form of a global sum within the evidentiary range and guided by equitable considerations as an exceptional measure.
Harj Narulla, a barrister at Doughty Street Chambers and legal counsel for the Solomon Islands, told Carbon Brief:
Judge Georg Nolte:
As the Court has noted, the IPCC has found that, by 2019, approximately 58 per cent of all anthropogenic GHG emissions since the beginning of industrialization were emitted prior to 1990, while the remaining 42 per cent were emitted between 1990 and 2019.
GHG emissions since the second half of the 1980s can only have been wrongful to the extent that States either did not comply with their treaty-based mitigation commitments and obligations or did not undertake their best efforts to prevent significant harm to the climate system pursuant to the general customary obligation.
All this suggests that only a limited amount of all anthropogenic GHG emissions since industrialization has been caused by wrongful acts.
Harm to the climate system is harm to a common good resulting from collective actions or omissions, whether wrongful or not. The possible contribution to such harm by a claimant State would need to be considered in accordance with Article 39 ARSIWA, and the quantum of compensation arrived at by a court would need to be apportioned among all States concerned.
Article 39 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) deals with the concept of "contribution to the injury." It provides that when determining reparation for an internationally wrongful act, any wilful or negligent action or omission by the injured State—or any person or entity in relation to whom reparation is sought—must be taken into account if it contributed to the injury. This means that if the injured party played a role in causing or worsening its own injury, the amount or scope of reparation may be adjusted accordingly to reflect that contribution.
This widely used legal principle is known as "contributory fault" but is here being applied in international law, to the fault of nations. Judge Nolte is saying, essentially, “Look none of us is blameless. We use smartphones. We eat hamburgers. But can you seriously compare the lifestyle of a USAnian to a Vanuatan islander? It is the responsibility of the former to bring their greenhouse impact down, and to pay for the damage it has caused and is causing in the meantime.”Dr Joana Setzer, an environmental lawyer and an associate professorial research fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science’s Grantham Institute, adds that the court’s conclusion that “states are not only responsible for reducing their own emissions”, but “also have a due diligence duty to regulate private actors under their jurisdiction,” has larger implications. Stezer told Carbon Brief:
Burkina Faso and Tuvalu do not contribute — and have never contributed — to GHG emissions on a scale remotely comparable to that of Germany or any other industrialized country. Their emissions are minimal to the point of being statistically negligible in the context of global GHG emissions, and a generalized statement such as that used in paragraph 277 of the Advisory Opinion does not do justice to their situation as compared to highly industrialized States, and unfairly attributes to them a much more important role in GHG emissions than they actually play. While GHG emissions have existed throughout the history of life on Earth, climate change, as recognized by scientific consensus and codified in Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (hereinafter “UNFCCC”), arises when GHG concentrations in the atmosphere reach certain levels that interfere dangerously with the stability and functioning of the climate system. In this regard, the assertion that climate change is “inherently a consequence of activities . . . of all States” (emphasis added) is scientifically ill-grounded.
The cessation of conduct which has led to a breach of an international obligation is the first requirement for eliminating the consequences of a wrongful act. The State responsible for the breach of its international obligations is also under an obligation to make reparation for its wrongful act. Reparation may be achieved by restitution, compensation, satisfaction or a combination thereof. The Court has in the past indicated that environmental damage is compensable under international law, and that compensation will be due for both damage caused to the environment, “in and of itself”, and expenses incurred by injured States as a consequence of such damage.
Coming Attractions
Will this opinion affect the upcoming deliberations of COP30 in Belem, Brazil in November? You betcha.
Judge Sarah H. Cleveland:
That means you, Brazil.
Figueres:
This decision reduces, let's say, the map of creative ambiguity concepts that can be used, because it provides so much clarity to say, no, all of these arguments just are no longer on the table. And so what it, interestingly, what it does, in a sense, is it makes negotiations tougher because there's more legal clarity. And it makes them tougher in the sense that there will, obviously, still be states that refuse to accept this because it's not legally binding, they're not parties to the ICJ, they, you know, don't feel that the ICJ speaks for them or for any international legal structure, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
Does it matter that the United States has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement, much in the same fashion as Australia ratified and then withdrew from the Kyoto Accord? Not at all. It is like a thief saying, “I refuse to reognize private property.”
Judge Dire Tladi:
Many have interpreted Article 4 (2) [Paris Agreement] as giving complete discretion to the party formulating the NDCs (national pledges), i.e. because the contributions are nationally determined, the party is free to determine its NDCs as it deems fit, with no room for objective assessment of whether a party’s NDCs are sufficient. Fancy phrases such as “bottom-up approach”, and distinctions such as the one between “obligations of conduct” and “obligations of result”, have been deployed to perpetuate this interpretation. Yet, since the NDCs are the main tool for achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement, this interpretation would leave the Paris Agreement as a hollow shell, dependent on the will and convenience of each individual party. How different would such a scenario be to Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons?
In this Opinion, the Court concludes that parties to the Paris Agreement do not have an unfettered discretion to determine the content of their NDCs. Rather, the Court interprets Article 4 (2) to mean that parties have an obligation to pursue the temperature goal expressed in Article 2, and that each individual NDC must be objectively capable of contributing towards the temperature goal or in the language used by the Court, NDCs “when taken together, are capable of achieving the temperature goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels”
The parties would likely fail to meet the 1.5°C target, and consequently would likely fail to achieve the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”, if each party had complete freedom to set inadequate NDCs. This is precisely the entrenchment of Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons. Thus, interpreting Article 4 (2) of the Paris Agreement, as leaving the NDCs to the unfettered discretion of parties is contrary to the object and purpose of the Paris Agreement.
The second, and more directly relevant point, is that the relationship between the customary international law duty to prevent significant harm, and the standard of due diligence, has a particular consequence for the interpretation of Article 4 (2) of the Paris Agreement in accordance with the rule set forth in Article 31 (3) (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The Court has stated, in this Opinion, that because of the nature of the climate change threat, the standard of due diligence to be applied is a stringent one. Applying a stringent standard of due diligence requires the setting of NDCs which are sufficiently high so as to be capable of contributing to the achievement of the object and purpose of the Paris Agreement. This means, by definition, that the sufficiency of the NDCs cannot be subject to the determination of the submitting State.
I still maintain modest hope. Modest hope that those in positions of power will realize, before it is too late, that money cannot be eaten. Hope that future generations will make better choices.
I could not say it any better than Judge Tladi and the others. Make it so.
What this Court has released into the public policy ring is not a vaquilla with padded horns. It is a fighting bull.
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